OLTH GA

Thessaloniki Port Authority S.A. (ThPA/OLTH) operates Greece's second-largest port under a concession that runs to 2051. It handles containers and conventional cargo, offers warehousing, rentals and cruise/passenger services, and runs intermodal services with direct rail connections from the port to Sofia (Bulgaria), Niš (Serbia) and Skopje (North Macedonia), giving it a logical hinterland across the Balkans. In 2024, the port handled 566k TEU (+9% year-over-year) and 3.2m tons of conventional cargo (+9%), generating group revenue of €100.7m (+17%) with EBITDA of ~€42.6m and record net profit of about €28m.

Shares outstanding are 10,080,000 (par €3.00), and the company paid a €2.00 dividend in May 2025. The stock trades around €36.4, implying market capitalization of ~€367m. There is no bank debt; lease liabilities are ~€46.4m. Crucially, beyond cash and cash equivalents of €18.2m, OLTH holds ~€99.7m of term deposits classified as "other current assets," which are cash-like from an equity valuation standpoint. On that basis, enterprise value works out to roughly €295m today: €367m equity plus €46m leases minus ~€118m cash and term deposits. I will value the operating business on this EV definition throughout.

Pricing power is pragmatic rather than monopolistic. As the sole deep-water gateway for Northern Greece and a natural entry point to the Balkans, OLTH has latitude to adjust tariffs, but it must remain competitive relative to rival gateways such as Piraeus, Constanța, Koper and Rijeka. The evidence of pricing power is in the realized metrics: in 1H 2025, revenue per container move rose 4.3% after a February 2024 tariff adjustment, while revenue per conventional ton rose as cargo mix shifted toward higher-yield categories. Those are durable levers, not temporary surcharges.

This is a small-float, Greece-listed infrastructure asset controlled by a consortium. SEGT owns 67%, the Greek state retains a stub, and free float is under one-fifth. That ownership concentration depresses liquidity, complicates index inclusion, and tends to cap buyback programs even if valuation is attractive. Add to that the lingering governance noise around one of the controlling shareholders (widely covered in Greek press since 2017–2022) and you have a name that many global funds will either exclude on mandate constraints or treat with a higher governance discount than peers—even when the operating story is improving. The structural discount is visible when you mark EV properly (including term deposits) and compare to peers.

A second source of misperception is simply stale modeling. Many screeners net only "cash and cash equivalents" and ignore deposits >3 months sitting in "other current assets." OLTH's June 2025 interim shows €99.7m of such deposits. If those deposits are missed, the apparent EV/EBITDA jumps from ~6.9× to something that screens closer to ~9×, which can be the difference between "average" and "interesting" on a relative basis.

Finally, narrative traps. Piraeus—bigger and more widely followed—often dominates the Greek port narrative; by comparison, Thessaloniki is viewed as steady but unexciting. Yet the 2024 numbers and 1H 2025 mix/pricing data suggest a real inflection in both throughput and yield, and the Presidential Decree approving the Master Plan firmed the path to the Pier 6 buildout.

On governance, the Board was refreshed in May 2025; interim statements list a new nine-member Board with an independent chair and a CEO, and reiterate that the company has no bank borrowings and "sufficient liquidity" to meet the mandatory capex under the concession. The company maintains a Bulgarian subsidiary to support the inland network, which aligns with the strategy to be a Balkan multi-gateway. The capital return framework is conservative: pay a cash dividend (recent €2.00 per share) while funding capex largely from internal cash flow and deposits. Buybacks have not been a central tool, and with the free float under 20% they are unlikely to be a primary catalyst. I view that as a mild negative for near-term multiple expansion but a positive for balance-sheet resilience.

It is worth noting the January–February 2025 "Leonidsport" voluntary tender (at €27 per share) that received effectively zero acceptances but did result in market purchases of ~2.6% of the company. This indicates outsiders are willing to accumulate positions if the float loosens at the right price, but it also underscores that control is not realistically in play.

End-market demand is diversified: containerized exports and imports for Northern Greece and the Balkans, and conventional cargo (steel, bulk, project cargo) where Thessaloniki is Greece's leading transit port. Demand drivers are regional GDP, industrial output in the Balkans, and the competitiveness of rail corridors northbound. OLTH's intermodal network is a differentiator; the company runs direct rail services to Sofia and Niš, with an added block-train to Skopje, shortening door-to-door times and locking in customers who value reliability over first-cost.

Unit economics are improving on both price and cost lines. In 1H 2025, revenue per move rose to €216.9 from €207.9 (+4.3%), while the gross margin improved to 47.2% despite higher payroll and energy costs. For conventional cargo, revenue per ton increased from €6.99 to €8.14 as cargo mix shifted. Because port opex has a high fixed component, incremental volume and tariff increases carry outsized flow-through to EBITDA. That is visible in 2024's 17% revenue growth translating to ~25% EBITDA growth.

The through-cycle picture (2020–2024) shows steady growth from ~€72–78m revenue pre-privatization upgrades to €100.7m in 2024, with net income rising from ~€20m in 2020 to ~€28m in 2024. The 2024 profit was not "one-off" driven; it was underpinned by higher volumes and pricing, and the 1H 2025 data show the drivers persisting. Cash conversion is strong: 1H 2025 operating cash flow was ~€20.3m despite an H1 tax outflow and working capital swings. OLTH deployed cash into term deposits (hence the large "other current assets"), paid the €20.2m dividend, and still carries ~€118m cash and deposits.

Balance-sheet risk is low: no bank debt, only lease liabilities (~€46m). This is a port that can self-fund concession-mandated investments; the HRADF concession specifies €180m of mandatory capex by 2030, and the company explicitly states it has the liquidity to do so.

Normalization adjustments are modest. There are no COVID-era windfalls to strip out; instead, the out-year sensitivity is around how quickly the network attracts larger calls after Pier 6 and whether conventional cargo mix stays favorable. I normalize 2025–2026 EBITDA in the low-to-mid €40ms absent an exogenous shock.

Set-up and arithmetic. Shares: 10.080m. Price: ~€36.4. Market cap: ~€366.9m. Cash & cash equivalents: €18.2m. Term deposits in "other current assets": ~€99.7m. Lease liabilities: ~€46.4m. Enterprise value (EV) = €366.9m + €46.4m − €118.0m ≈ €295.3m. 2024 EBITDA = €42.6m. EV/EBITDA (trailing) ≈ 6.9×. 2024 P/E ≈ 13.1× on ~€28m net profit. Dividend yield at €2.00 ≈ 5.5%.

Relative. Piraeus Port Authority (PPA) trades around ~7.5–8.5× EV/EBITDA on LTM numbers, depending on source and day. Luka Koper's implied multiple has ranged mid- to high-single digits. Against that backdrop, OLTH at ~6.9× with a cleaner balance sheet and visible tariff/mix momentum is not stretched. I do not assume a peer-parity rerating; I anchor the base case at 7.5× given OLTH's smaller scale but improving quality.

Absolute (reverse-DCF style). If I require an equity IRR of ~9–10% (Greece 10-year ~3.3% plus ~600bp premium for small-float governance risk) and assume EBITDA holds ~€44m for the next two years with maintenance capex and working capital neutral, today's EV implies an after-tax operating cash yield of ~9–10% on the enterprise—consistent with the base-case return I model. This back-solves to a fair EV/EBITDA in the mid-7s given the company's low leverage and long-lived concession assets.

Sanity check: these multiples are within European port base rates, and implied returns on invested capital sit comfortably above my ~9% equity discount benchmark without requiring heroic throughput growth.

The governance overhang is real. SEGT's control and the Belterra association create a persistent "optics discount." If we were to see related-party dealings that disadvantage minorities, or a reversal in the Board's independent posture, I would exit. I monitor Athens Exchange announcements and interim notes for any such transactions.

Execution and labor are the second cluster. If Pier 6 cost inflation or delays push the spend beyond 2030 or strain liquidity, the thesis weakens; my kill-switch would be evidence the company must lever materially to meet concession obligations. On labor, the new three-year collective agreement signed in 2025 reduces near-term disruption risk, but I would watch for work-rule friction as construction advances.

Macro and corridor risk are third. A Balkan rail disruption, sanctions-related trade reroute that bypasses Thessaloniki, or a sharp downturn in regional industrial output would stress the bear case. Hedges are portfolio-level (e.g., pairing OLTH with a short in a more levered European port/logistics operator) rather than name-specific given the low float.

LONG. I think the asymmetry is good enough to act. The equity prices the core port at ~6.9× trailing EBITDA once you net term deposits correctly, while the fundamental trajectory—higher revenue per move/ton, container growth off a modest base, and a now-de-risked capital program—points to a reasonable path to mid-single digit EBITDA growth in 2025 and a stable dividend around €2. Near-term milestones (2025 results, Pier 6 awards/progress updates, the next dividend) should keep the story in motion. I would enter in the low- to mid-€30s, target ~€40–€41 in the base case within 12 months plus dividend (~€2), and reassess on Pier 6 execution and any governance surprises.

The signposts I will monitor monthly are TEU and conventional throughput, revenue/move metrics, Pier 6 contracts and construction mobilization, cash and deposit balances versus capex, and any Board or shareholder-structure developments.